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STATE V. BROSSART: ADAPTING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT FOR A FUTURE WITH DRONES
By: Thomas A. Bryan +
Imagine a situation in which law enforcement officials unexpectedly confront
a father and son. 1 The confrontation quickly escalates into an armed struggle
leading to the father’s arrest and the detainment of his adult son. 2 After the
father’s arrest, police go to the family’s home and request admittance to the
defendant’s properties. 3 The three adult sons present in the home deny the
request. 4 Without consent and unbeknownst to the family inside, the authorities
then launch an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to survey the father’s properties
in an effort to gather information. 5 The intelligence gathered by this drone is
later used to arrest and prosecute five family members. 6
The facts above do not refer to an anti-terrorism-related arrest in Afghanistan,
Pakistan or Yemen. 7 Rather, they refer to events that took place in rural North
+
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1. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-0049, Slip Op. at 3 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012)
(discussing the initial confrontation between Rodney Brossart and the police that led to the suit).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 1–2; Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American
Citizen, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen.
7. Drones have gained public notoriety for their controversial role in the United States’ War
on Terror. See Death From Afar: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3–9, 2012, at 61,
61 (reporting that U.S. drones have been used for targeted killings in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia as part of the war on terrorism). The U.S. Department of Defense defines the War on
Terror as military operations to combat terrorism launched following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. See INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. D-2009-073, DOD
COMPONENTS’ USE OF GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING PROVIDED FOR
PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION 1 (2009), available at
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy09/09-073.pdf. In addition to the War on Terror, the United
States has also used UAVs in a number of military conflicts and humanitarian efforts, such as those
in Kosovo, Iraq, Haiti, and Libya. See JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136,
U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, at Summary (2012), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf; Greg Miller, CIA Rushed to Rescue Envoys in Libya Siege, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2012, at A1.
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Dakota and form the basis for the prosecution of Rodney Brossart and his four
children in State v. Brossart. 8 As one of the first cases involving the use of a
UAV, or drone, 9 to monitor civilians in the United States, the Brossart case has
received wide media attention and has led to much speculation as to its Fourth
Amendment implications. 10
Tracing its roots to the Founding Fathers’ desire “that our society should be
one in which citizens ‘dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance,’” 11 Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence has developed in a
complicated, and sometimes conflicting, manner. 12
Initially, Fourth
Amendment search analysis was almost exclusively concerned with the
government’s violation of a person’s property interests. 13 However, in the 1960s
this method of analysis transformed in response to technological changes
enabling the government to obtain information about the interior of a home
without physically entering it. 14 The contours of search analysis were redefined
again in 2012 in response to the emergence of GPS technology, which enables
law enforcement the ability to conduct long-term surveillance of a person. 15
8. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049 at 3–6.
9. An UAV, commonly known as a drone, is any aircraft capable of sustained flight that is
guided “without an onboard crew.” Introduction of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), DEP’T
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/specials/uav2002/(last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also The
UAV-The Future of the Sky, THEUAV.COM, http://www.theuav.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2013)
(equating drones with UAVS).
10. See, e.g., Koebler, supra note 6; Jason Koebler, First Man Arrested with Drone Evidence
Vows to Fight Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2012/04/09/first-man-arrested-with-drone-evidence-vows
-to-fight-case; Domestic drone justice: US court greenlights Police UAV use, RUSSIA TODAY (Aug.
3, 2012, 4:51 AM), http://rt.com/usa/domestic-drone-court-ruling-743.
11. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
12. According to many scholars, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is among the most
confusing areas of U.S. law. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions related to the
Fourth Amendment are embarrassing, have been contradictory, and result in odd rules); Ronald J.
Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus
General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998) (noting that Fourth
Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court “lack[] coherence and predictability); Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Orin S. Kerr,
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011)
(explaining how “judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment are infamous for their
byzantine patchwork of protections”).
13. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION, § 6.02, at 68–70 (5th ed. 2010) (laying out the pre-Katz trespass
doctrine).
14. See id. § 6.03, at 71.
15. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the installation of a
GPS tracking device on a defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent monitoring of the defendant’s
movements violated the Fourth Amendment) mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Even though the Court has issued some seemingly contradictory decisions
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, it has consistently sought to maintain that
“the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable government intrusion” embodies the “very core” of the Fourth
Amendment. 16
The imminent introduction of UAV technology into everyday civilian life in
the United States will change citizen interaction with law enforcement and
potentially lead to further development in Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence. 17 Rodney Brossart’s challenge to the local sheriff’s use of UAV
technology in North Dakota has become a symbol to those who fear an erosion
of Fourth Amendment protections. 18 This fear has become particularly
heightened after the trial court denied Brossart’s motion to dismiss the criminal
charges or suppress the drone-acquired evidence in his case. 19
This Comment analyzes the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that guided the
court’s decision in State v. Brossart. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and introduces how the
imminent rise in the domestic use of drones challenges this jurisprudence. 20
This Part begins by tracing the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence from the trespass doctrine to the reasonable expectation of privacy
test set forth in Katz v. United States. 21 Part I then considers changes the
Supreme Court brought about in Fourth Amendment analysis through United
States v. Jones. 22 Part I concludes by highlighting the emergence of the use of
UAVs in the United States and presenting the facts of the Brossart case as a test

16. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
17. See Larry Abramson, Drones: From War Weapon To Homemade Toy, NPR (Aug. 2,
2012, 4:24 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/02/157441681/drones-from-war-weapon-to-home
made-toy (speculating that drones will become widespread in the next several years); Jason
Koebler, The Coming Drone Revolution: What You Should Know, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr.
5, 2012) http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/05/the-coming-drone-revolution-what
-you-should-know (highlighting the privacy concerns that the widespread use of drones will incite).
18. See S.H. Blannelberry, Drone-Aided Arrest Raises Questions About 4th Amendment,
GUNS.COM (June 9, 2012), http://www.guns.com/2012/06/09/drone-aided-arrest-4th-amendment
(discussing how the Brossart case has brought UAV use by police to the public’s attention).
19. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip Op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012)
(denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the use of a UAV); Joe Wolverton, II, The
Fourth Amendment and the Drones: How Will It Apply?, NEW AM. (Aug. 15, 2012, 5:30 PM),
http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/12486-the-fourth-amendment-and-drones
-how-will-it-apply (questioning how UAV use by law enforcement will be constitutionally
interpreted, particularly after the Brossart case).
20. See infra Part I.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (supplanting the “trespass” doctrine with
the reasonable expectation of privacy test in Fourth Amendment analysis).
22. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (reviving the trespass doctrine and
holding that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle to monitor a suspect’s movements is a
search under the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes a physical trespass by the government)
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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case illustrating a scenario that will likely become more common as the use of
UAVs increases domestically. Part II applies existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to the Brossart facts and demonstrates that the court correctly
concluded that law enforcement’s use of a UAV in this case did not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search. Part III argues that Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence must be strengthened through Congressional action in order to
sufficiently protect privacy in a new age where widespread domestic UAV use
is common.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: DRONES PRESENT A CHALLENGE TO CURRENT FOURTH
AMENDMENT SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE.
A. From Boyd to Jones: The Development of Fourth Amendment Search
Jurisprudence
1. A Historical Look at the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 23
The meaning of, and intent behind, those fifty-four words have been debated
by both practicing attorneys and scholars for decades, leading to a plethora of
interpretations from the Supreme Court and lower courts alike. 24 More than two
centuries since its adoption, the Amendment’s very purpose continues to be
debated. 25 Yet, most scholars agree that the Framers of the Constitution
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 4.01, at 49–50.
25. See, e.g., THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 16–17 (2008) [hereinafter CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT] (discussing the
“‘neverending’ debate” over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Thomas Clancy, What Is a
“Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter
Clancy, What is a “Search”?] (explaining that the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the
Eighteenth Century was a reaction against colonial abuses); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy,
and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1525 (1996)
(concluding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment includes not only the right of the innocent to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, but the right of all people to be treated fairly and hence
to be searched and perhaps punished because the government knows (to some set level of certainty)
that they deserve to be searched and punished”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 590 (1999) (stating that “the Framers adopted
constitutional search and seizure provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of
person and house by prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.”); Scott E. Sundby,
“Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994) (defining the “constitutional value underlying the Fourth
Amendment as that of ‘trust’ between the government and the citizenry”).
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included the Fourth Amendment to protect against the extreme and
unpredictable invasions of property that were common in colonial America. 26
Until 1967, the Supreme Court based its Fourth Amendment search analyses
on property and trespass theories. 27 The 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States
introduced property-rights concepts into the Fourth Amendment analysis. 28
In Boyd, the prosecution sought to show that the defendants committed customs
fraud by forcing them to present receipts showing that they had paid import
duties for only 29 of the 35 cases of plate glass that they brought in to the
country. 29 The Court concluded that the government could not require the
defendants to produce the receipts, reasoning that the defendants had a property
interest in the receipts that could not be superceded without a warrant. 30 Relying
on its Boyd decision, the Supreme Court consistently declined to find a violation
of the Fourth Amendment absent a physical trespass. 31 After the Boyd test was
26. Clancy, What is a “Search”?, supra note 25, at 4; see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra
note 13, § 4.03 at 52 (noting that the Fourth Amendment came about as a result of the colonists
experience with writs of assistance and general warrants, which allowed agents to search a colonists
home at will); Davies, supra note 25, at 561–67 (tracing the Framer’s motivation for drafting the
Fourth Amendment to three events leading up to the American Revolution where the British used
extreme search and seizure practices).
27. See CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 3.1.1, at 46 (explaining that,
prior to the Katz decision, the Court considered Fourth Amendment questions in light of the
property rights at stake and only allowed government intrusion without a warrant where the
government had a superior property right); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at
68–69 (discussing the Court’s decisions prior to Katz v. United States in 1967, where the Fourth
Amendment was analyzed using a property rights/trespass approach).
28. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617–18 (1886); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (identifying Boyd as the case that “laid the seeds of the property-right
interpretation” in Fourth Amendment cases); Clancy, What is a “Search”?, supra note 25, at 13
(noting that Boyd was the first case in which the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the Fourth
Amendment).
29. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617–18.
30. Id. at 634–35. The Court also asserted that the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent “the
invasion of a [man’s] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”
Id. at 630.
31. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (quoting Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139, 142 (1962)). While Dressler and Michaels identify Boyd as the “seed” of the historical
property rights test of the Fourth Amendment, most scholars point to Olmstead v. United States as
the best example of the Fourth Amendment analysis under this test. See id.; Ric Simmons, From
Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002) (discussing the importance of Olmstead in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its application of the trespass doctrine). In Olmstead, the
government sought to prosecute the principal conspirator in a liquor smuggling operation during
prohibition. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–56 (1928). During the investigation,
government agents wiretapped the phone lines that connected the residences of the various co
-conspirators with their main office. Id. at 456–57. Information garnered through the wiretaps over
a period of several months led to the indictment and subsequent conviction for violations of the
National Prohibition Act. Id. at 455, 457. The defendant challenged the admission of evidence
obtained from the wiretaps as a violating of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 455. The Supreme
Court held that, because the agents had not overheard the conversations from inside either parties’
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established, the Supreme Court enunciated the consequences for violating the
Fourth Amendment, thus promulgating the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States. 32 In basic terms, the exclusionary rule requires that evidence derivative
of an illegal search or seizure may not be used against a criminal defendant at
trial. 33
2. Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The Modern Fourth
Amendment Test
The 1967 decision in Katz v. United States laid out the modern test for
analyzing searches under the Fourth Amendment. 34 In Katz, the defendant
challenged his conviction for sending gambling information over the telephone
on the grounds that the evidence used against him had been obtained during an
unconstitutional search. 35 The evidence had been gathered without a warrant by
FBI agents who used an electronic recording device attached to the outside of
the public telephone booth to intercept the defendant’s calls. 36 Rejecting the
trespass doctrine, the Supreme Court explained that the “Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places,” and therefore, penetration of the physical space was
not necessary for a violation to occur. 37 The Court thus concluded that the
government’s monitoring of the telephone booth constituted an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment. 38The Katz decision created an upheaval in
home, there was no “actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making
a seizure,” and the Fourth Amendment did not protect the defendant. Id. at 466; see also DRESSLER
& MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.02, at 69 (explaining that the Court held there was no Fourth
Amendment violation because there was no physical invasion of the defendant’s property);
CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 3.2.2, at 53–54 (interpreting the Olmstead
decision as reasoning that conversations generally are not protected under the Fourth Amendment
because they were not included in the enumerated list of protected items in the Amendment’s
language and are not tangible).
32. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that items seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment should not have been used at trial and should be returned to the
defendant); CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, at 613. In Weeks, the police,
without a warrant, arrested the defendant , entered his home , seized a number of documents, and
used those seized documents against him at trial, despite repeated requests by the Defendant for
their return. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386–88. Addressing the defendant’s challenge to the use of the
evidence, the Supreme Court determined that the seizure of the defendant’s documents violated the
Fourth Amendment and, as such, prohibited their use by the prosecution at trial. Id. at 397–98.
The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule only to federal cases until the Court’s decision
in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
33. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 4.04[B], at 56.
34. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03[A], at 70.
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348–50 (1967).
36. Id. at 348. At the time of Katz’s conviction, federal statute forbade the transmission of
bets or wages through wire communication devices. Id. The defendant placed calls to Miami and
Boston from Los Angeles. Id.
37. Id. at 351–53.
38. Id. at 359.
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by effectively nullifying the
property-interest-based test as the controlling factor defining a search. 39 Some
scholars have proffered that the introduction of modern technology in the 1960s,
enabling the government to intercept calls remotely, was the key factor that
moved the Court to abandon the trespass doctrine. 40 In its place, the Court used
a two-prong test articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion. 41 The test is
composed of a subjective prong that requires that the person “exhibited an actual
. . . expectation of privacy” and an objective prong, which requires that this
“expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 42
Defendants must satisfy both prongs to prove the existence of an unreasonable
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 43 The Katz Court replaced the
trespass doctrine with the view that a search occurs when a person has an
expectation of privacy in an item or place that society is willing to recognize as
objectively reasonable. 44
3. Oliver: Distinguishing Between the Home, Curtilage, and an Open Field
While the Katz test has been the foremost Fourth Amendment search test for
the last four decades, Fourth Amendment analysis also takes into account the
location where the search occurred. 45 The Supreme Court’s decision in Oliver v.
United States helps to define what is a protected area under the Fourth
Amendment. 46
Oliver was a consolidation of two cases from Kentucky and Maine in which
police officers searched the defendants’ lands without warrants after receiving

39. Simmons, supra note 31, at 1307.
40. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03[A], at 71. Dressler and Michaels note
that, in light of the changes in technology, Justice Harlan believed that the trespass analysis now
“constituted ‘bad physics as well as bad law.’” Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
41. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
supra note 25, at 47, 59–60 (explaining that Justice Harlan’s opinion contains the language of the
modern test and that the test is composed of two-prongs, one is objective and the other is
subjective).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13 § 6.03[C], at 72 (stating that there is no search
if either prong of the test is lacking).
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
45. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that, while the Fourth
Amendment protects people, the decision of exactly how much protection the Fourth Amendment
provides to a person must be decided with “reference to a ‘place’”); see also Simmons, supra note
31, at 1311–12 (noting that “Harlan’s standard-setting concurrence implies that Katz was not really
about rejecting the ‘place-based’ analysis” but takes into account the location of information sought
to be protected).
46. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 84–86 (discussing Oliver at the “open
fields” doctrine).
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anonymous tips that marijuana was being grown there. 47 Both defendants
moved to suppress the evidence taken from these forays onto their properties by
law enforcement and argued that the warrantless searches were unreasonable
and conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 48
The Supreme Court held that the entries onto the defendants’ properties did
not constitute Fourth Amendment searches. 49 The Court reasoned that no search
occurred because, although the Fourth Amendment provides special protection
to the home, such protection does not extend to activities conducted in open
fields unless they are in the immediate adjacency of the home. 50 Oliver
identified three categories of places for Fourth Amendment purposes: (1) the
home, where Fourth Amendment protections are at their maximum;
(2) the curtilage, or “land immediately surrounding and associated with the
home,” 51 which receives limited protection; and (3) open fields, which do not
receive any Fourth Amendment protection. 52 In light of Oliver, the analysis of
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173–75 (1984). In the first of the two consolidated
cases, two plain-clothed police officers entered the defendant’s 200 acre farm in rural Kentucky
through a private road that was marked with various “No Trespassing” signs while driving an
unmarked police vehicle. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Once inside the defendant’s property, the officers drove
past the defendant’s home and drove a significant distance onto the property before encountering a
locked gate and “No Trespassing” signs on the fences on either side of the gate. Id. at 362. The
officers parked their vehicle and followed a path through a gap in the fence that led them to a
camper that was used as a “home” and a barn. Id. The officers then encountered an unknown
person who warned them that hunting was not allowed on the property, but they continued on until
they found an isolated marijuana field more than one and four-tenths of a mile from the defendant’s
home but still on his property, “bounded on all sides by woods, fences and embankments,” and
virtually invisible from all publicly accessible land. Id. at 362–63. In the second case, two police
officers entered the defendant’s property, which was completely surrounded by various fences and
“No Trespassing” signs. State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 491 (Me. 1982) rev’d sub nom. Oliver,
466 U.S. 170. The officers followed a path across the defendant’s property through a wooded area
until reaching two clearings where marijuana was being grown, both of which were nearly
impossible to see unless one was purposely looking for them. Id.
48. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–75.
49. Id. at 181.
50. Id. at 178. The Court specifically explained that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy for outdoor activities taking place in fields unless other criteria are met, i.e., proximity to
the home. Id.
51. Id. at 180. In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court identified four factors for
determining whether an area is curtilage: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the
home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation.” United States v. Dunn, 180 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987); see also Joseph J. Vacek, Big
Brother Will Soon be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory and Operational Issues
Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 680
(2009) (noting that “curtilage is a legal ‘penumbra’”).
52. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.06[B], at 85–86. The open fields doctrine
did not originate in Oliver, but rather in Hester v. United States. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 25, § 4.4.1.1, at 123. The Court’s decision in Katz called into question
the continued validity of the “open fields” doctrine with its focus on the privacy interest of the
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whether aerial surveillance conducted by UAV constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search thus requires attention to the location observed. 53
4. Knotts, Karo and Kyllo: Balancing The Fourth Amendment’s Strong
Protections of the Home with New Technologies
The emergence of technology enabling the government to obtain information
about an enclosed area without physically entering the area prompted the
Supreme Court to abandon its Fourth Amendment property-rights analysis and
adopt the Katz test. 54 However, this test has not fully resolved the optimal
balance between the Fourth Amendment protections of the home and the
government’s use of ever-evolving technologies. 55 The following cases
illustrate the Court’s struggle with applying the Fourth Amendment in the face
of technological innovation.
In United States v. Knotts, three individuals were arrested for producing
methamphetamine in a clandestine laboratory, which police discovered by
installing a radio transmitter in a container of chloroform and tracking the
container’s movements from the chloroform manufacturing plant to a cabin in
rural Wisconsin. 56 At trial, one of the defendants moved to suppress the
evidence of the methamphetamine laboratory, arguing that the use of a
transmitter to track the car was an unreasonable search. 57 The Supreme Court
rejected the argument, explaining that use of the technology was not
unconstitutional because police officers could have visually tracked the vehicle
containing the chloroform container without using the disputed technology, and

individual, as opposed to the place. Id. § 4.4.1.1, at 124. By reaffirming the open fields doctrine
in Oliver, the Court confirmed this doctrine’s continued validity post-Katz. See id. In Hester,
federal revenue officers, acting on a tip and without a warrant, observed the defendant give a
passer-by a bottle of illegally-distilled moonshine whiskey from a distance of fifty to one hundred
yards away. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). After pursuing the defendant, the
officers entered his father’s property, seized evidence of the illicit whiskey, and observed other cars
approach the defendant’s home. Id. The defendant was convicted of concealing distilled spirits
based on the officer’s observations, but challenged the evidence as being the product of an
impermissible Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 57–58. The Court held that because the
defendant’s movements uncovered the whiskey, the agents observations did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search as Fourth Amendment protections are “not extened to the open fields.” Id. at
58–59.
53. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 680 (noting that there will be a question of whether the area
observed is an open field or curtilage when UAVs are used for surveillance, leading to the potential
for Fourth Amendment implications).
54. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.03, at 71.
55. See id., § 6.09[A], at 93–94 (noting the Court’s challenge in dealing with modern
technology).
56. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–79 (1983). Chloroform is a chemical used in
the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Id. at 278. The police discovered the laboratory after
obtaining a search warrant for the cabin based on the information gathered from the transmitter. Id.
at 279.
57. Id.
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because the transmitter did not provide any information about activities inside
the cabin. 58
The Court considered a similar issue but reached a different conclusion
in United States v. Karo. 59 In Karo, federal agents received information that
three defendants purchased ether to extract cocaine from clothes imported into
the United States. 60 Before the defendants picked up the ether container, the
agents placed an electronic monitoring device in the container and monitored
the container’s movements. 61 Based on the tracking information gathered, the
police obtained a warrant to search the home where the officers believed the
ether was being used. 62 However, unlike the Knotts situation, the federal agents
in Karo were unable to visually monitor the container during the entire
transaction. 63 Instead, they had to rely on the electronic monitoring device,
which revealed the container’s movements both outside and inside the
defendants’ home. 64 The Supreme Court concluded that the agents’ actions in
monitoring the container’s location with the electronic device while in the home
constituted an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment search. 65 The fact that the
agents could not have verified the movements of the ether container inside the
home without using the monitoring technology was critical to the Court’s
analysis. 66 Karo’s facts are differentiable from the facts in Knotts on this point
because the tracker used in the Knotts container provided no information to the
government about the container’s movement within the defendants’ cabin. 67
Thus, with reference to technological innovation, Karo reaffirmed the strong
protection given to the home under the Fourth Amendment. 68

58. Id. at 284–85; see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.09[C], at 96
(explaining that the Court’s holding was based on two important facts: (1) the police could have
secured the same information by following the defendant’s vehicle, and (2) the device had a limited
use and did not reveal any private activities in the home).
59. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
60. Id. at 708.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 710.
63. Id. at 708–10. The officers had also lost the signal of the transmitter in Knotts, but it was
recovered within one hour. with assistance of a helicopter. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. By contrast,
the Karo agents lost track of their transmitter several occasions when it moved undetected between
various locations. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10. In each instance the police were ultimately able to
relocate the tracker, in one instance to the very locker in which it was located . Id.
64. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–10.
65. Id. at 716–19 (explaining that the fact that the beeper monitored the container inside the
home was of great importance to the Court’s determination given the presumption that warrantless
searches of the home are unreasonable).
66. See id. at 715–16.
67. Id. at 715 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281) (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 718.
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Kyllo v. United States reaffirmed this strong protection afforded to the interior
of the home under the Fourth Amendment. 69 In Kyllo, two federal agents,
suspecting the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, sought to confirm
their suspicions by using a thermal imaging camera to scan the defendant’s home
from a vehicle parked across the street. 70 The agents used the results of the scan
to obtain a search warrant. 71 Upon entering the home, the agents confirmed that
the defendant was indeed growing over 100 marijuana plants inside. 72 The
defendant challenged the thermal scan as a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 73 The Supreme Court held that the scan constituted a Fourth
Amendment search, reasoning that government use of technology, not readily
available for public use, without a warrant, to obtain intimate details of one’s
home not otherwise discoverable without physical intrusion into the protected
area, is an unreasonable search. 74
The Knotts, Karo and Kyllo trio of cases underscore the Fourth Amendment’s
strong presumption in favor of protecting the home. 75 The Court has emphasized
“that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance of the house.’” 76
These cases suggest that if a technological innovation is used to gather details
about a home that are not otherwise discoverable without physical intrusion into
the space, whether from the ground or from the sky, then the use is a
presumptively unreasonable search. 77 These cases also indicate that technology
used to conduct a search must be available for public use for the search to be
considered reasonable. 78

69. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal
imaging device to measure the amount of heat coming from inside of a home violated the Fourth
Amendment).
70. Id. at 29–30.
71. Id. at 30. The scan revealed that “the roof over the garage and a side wall of [the
defendant’s] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer
than neighboring homes.” Id. This fact was consistent with the use of high-intensity halide lights
for the interior growth of marijuana. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 40.
75. See supra notes 55, 63, 71 and accompanying text.
76. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
77. Travis Dunlap, We’ve Got Our Eyes on You: When Surveillance by Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 173, 197 (2009).
78. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 683 (suggesting the test for whether a technology is available
for general public use may “turn on whether Wal-Mart sells it or not”); see also Simmons, supra
note 31, at 1334 (explaining that what the court likely meant by “general public use” is “that if a
technology becomes so widespread and commonplace that it changes societal expectations of
privacy, its use is no longer considered a ‘search’”).
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5. Ciraolo and Riley: The Fourth Amendment and Aerial Surveillance of the
Home
As UAVs become part of everyday day activities, the Supreme Court will not
approach aerial surveillance in a void. In the past, the Court has used Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether aerial surveillance
of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. 79 In California v. Ciraolo,
two police officers, acting on a telephone tip, flew an airplane 1,000 feet over
the defendant’s property, and were able to identify large marijuana plants
growing in the defendant’s yard. 80 Armed with the information gathered from
the aerial surveillance, the officers obtained a search warrant, searched the
defendant’s property, and found the marijuana plants. 81 The defendant
challenged the police’s flyover, arguing that an intricate fencing system
surrounding the property expressed an expectation of privacy. 82 The Supreme
Court concluded that building fences around the property did not create a
reasonable expectation that the area would not be viewed from above. 83 The
Court further stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does not require the
police travelling in the public airways . . . to obtain a warrant in order to observe
what is visible to the naked eye.” 84 Finally, the Court concluded that because
the observations were conducted from legally navigable airspace, the aerial
surveillance did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 85

79. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.07[A], at 87–88 (explaining the basic
rules for constitutional aerial surveillance); Vacek, supra note 51, at 682 (noting that the Court has
generally held that aerial surveillance from an aircraft in navigable airspace is permitted because
one does not have a privacy interest in anything that can be seen from above).
80. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986). The area where the defendant was
growing marijuana was not visible from the ground because the yard was completely fenced in. Id.
The officers were readily able to identify the plants as marijuana using the naked eye. Id. at 213.
81. Id. at 209–10.
82. Id. at 211.
83. Id. at 214. In fact, the Court noted that the defendant’s fence was not sufficient to manifest
a complete expectation of privacy because it would not be sufficient to “shield these plants from
the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus”. Id. at 211.
The Court also noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
84. Id. at 215.
85. Id. at 213–15. Current federal regulations establish the following minimum safe altitudes
for flight in an airplane: 1,000 feet “[o]ver any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over
any open air assembly of persons” and 500 feet in all other areas.
14 C.F.R.
§ 91.119(b)(c) (2012). Helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-shift-control aircraft may
operate at lower altitudes so long as “the operation is conducted without hazard to persons or
property on the surface.” § 91.119(d). The Court reasoned that, while the yard was in the curtilage
of the defendant’s home, the Fourth Amendment’s protection of curtilage only extends to “intimate
activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” and police are not
required to ignore what they can see from a public vantage point. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
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In Florida v. Riley, the Court extended the Ciraolo reasoning to a low level
helicopter flyover that revealed that the defendant was growing marijuana in a
greenhouse, which was within twenty feet of the defendant’s trailer and had
translucent roofing with missing panels. 86 The defendant challenged the aerial
surveillance as an unreasonable search. 87 The Supreme Court held that there
was no violation of the Fourth Amendment because the defendant could not
reasonably expect that his greenhouse was free from aerial observation. 88 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the helicopter had been flying at a
legal altitude and that it had not hindered the defendant’s use of the area
surveyed. 89
Together, Ciarolo and Riley suggest that aerial surveillance of a home will
generally not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 90 The holdings in these
two cases though are limited to aerial surveillance conducted from “public
86. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–49 (1989). In Riley, a police officer conducted a
naked-eye aerial surveillance of the defendant’s property from a helicopter flying 400 feet above
the defendant’s property. Id. at 448. During the flyover, the police officer identified marijuana
through the openings in the roof and side of the greenhouse, neither of which were visible from
public vantage points on the ground. Id.
87. Id. at 447–48.
88. Id. at 450–51.
89. Id. at 450–52. The Riley Court’s language appears to echo the language of United States
v. Causby, where the Court considered whether low-level flyovers infringed on a person’s property
rights. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946) (holding that “airspace, apart
from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain” and that “[f]lights over
private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land”). One scholar questions whether the case facts
truly support the Court’s decision by questioning how often low-level flights occur and how
anticipated they are, noting that because flying “a helicopter at 400 feet over a residential dwelling
may be technically allowed by regulation, it is neither prudent nor safe. The noise and disruption
produced would likely result in complaints and lawsuits, and the pilot’s options for safe landing in
the event of an emergency are severely limited at that low altitude.” Vacek, supra note 51, at 682
n.51.
90. Vacek, supra note 51, at 681. The use of aerial surveillance was also challenged in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986). In
Dow Chemical, a chemical manufacturer took significant security precautions to prevent its 2,000
acre facility from being visible from the ground and the air. Id. at 229. The defendant challenged
the government’s hiring of a private pilot to fly over its facility and take pictures with a “precision
aerial mapping camera” as part of the government’s environmental regulation efforts. Id. The
aerial surveillance was conducted without a warrant after the chemical manufacturer refused to
allow Environmental Protection Agency officials to conduct a follow-up visit to photograph the
facility. Id. Dow argued that the aerial surveillance constituted a search because it had a reasonable
and legitimate expectation of privacy—the industrial complex was analogous to the curtilage of a
home—and the aerial mapping camera enhanced the government’s senses in ways unavailable to
the public. Id. at 232–33. The Supreme Court found that the government “was not employing
some unique sensory device,” and that the industrial complex was “comparable to an open field
and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public
airspace.” Id. at 238–39. As a result, the Court concluded that the “aerial photographs of an
industrial plant complex from navigable airspace” did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Id. at 239.
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navigable airspace,” “in a physically nonintrusive manner,” and without
revealing “intimate activities traditionally connected with the use of a home or
curtilage.” 91 Aerial surveillance is also subject to Kyllo’s requirement that the
technology used to observe the home is available to the general public and that
it does not reveal information about the inside of the home that is not apparent
from the outside. 92
6. United States v. Jones: Back to the Future, a New Twist or More of the
Same?
Decided in January 2012, United States v. Jones 93 is arguably the Supreme
Court’s most significant Fourth Amendment case since Katz. 94 In Jones, federal
agents and local police suspected the defendant was trafficking narcotics and
installed a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on the car the
defendant was driving. 95 The data from the GPS device connected the defendant
to a drug stash house and led to his indictment. 96 At trial, the defendant
challenged the GPS evidence as being the product of an unlawful search. 97 The
Supreme Court unanimously held that use of the GPS under the factual
circumstances constituted a Fourth Amendment search. 98 While the Justices
agreed on the outcome, they reached the conclusion by three differing sets of
analysis. 99
91. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 6.07[A] at 87–88; see also United States v.
Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that police observation of a marijuana
growing operation from a helicopter at a height of 200 to 300 feet was not a search because the
aircraft was at a legally permissible altitude, there was no evidence that it interfered with the use
of the property, and the flight was not so rare that the defendant could argue that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy); United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the use of National Guard helicopters to survey marijuana growing around a defendant’s residence
did not constitute a search).
92. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
93. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (finding that a search occurred when a
GPS was placed on a car by the police), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
94. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States
v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (stating that the Jones decision “has
the potential to be the Supreme Court’s most important Fourth Amendment decision since it
decided Katz v. United States”).
95. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The car was registered in the name of the defendant’s wife. Id.
The District of Columbia’s Metropolitan Police obtained a warrant to install a GPS device on the
car in the District of Columbia within ten days of the warrant’s issue. Id. However, the GPS device
was installed on the eleventh day and in the neighboring state of Maryland. Id. Subsequently, the
government used the GPS device to track the defendant’s movements for a period of twenty-eight
days and obtained over two thousand pages of data. Id.
96. Id. at 948–49. The defendant’s first trial, for the same charge, ended with a hung jury,
and he was indicted again. Id.
97. Id. at 948.
98. Id. at 947, 949.
99. See infra notes 100–08 and accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s majority opinion, which changed the Fourth
Amendment search analysis to include both Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy test and the traditional property rights determination. 100 Justice Scalia
described Jones as a case in which the police physically intruded onto the
Defendant’s property to obtain information. 101 He reasoned that the framers of
the Fourth Amendment drafted the text to have a property connection and that
the police action in Jones would have been considered unreasonable at the time
of the Amendment’s adoption. 102 Justice Scalia explained that the Katz test
“added to, not substituted for, the common law trespassory test” and used the
historical property rights analysis to conclude that the installation of the GPS
tracking system on the defendant’s car was a search. 103
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Scalia’s analysis that a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when the government enters into a constitutionally
protected area to collect information. 104 However, in a separate concurring
opinion, Justice Sotomayor emphasized the importance of the Katz test,
explaining that without a physical trespass, Fourth Amendment analysis is
determined by a violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 105
Thus, both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor viewed the historical property rights
test and Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test as a two part inquiry,
working together to determine whether a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred. 106 However, Justice Sotomayor also agreed with Justice Alito’s
assessment that both tests may be ill-suited for current realities. 107 Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged that technological advances mean that a physical
entry is not necessary for surveillance, and noted that the trespass doctrine may
not be helpful when evaluating cases involving advanced surveillance
technologies. 108 She also highlighted that these advances will impact the Katz
test because the advances will lead to different societal expectations of
privacy. 109 Justice Sotomayor also explained that Katz’s proposition that if an
individual chooses to disclose information to another, then such information
100. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953; see also Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones:
Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 153 (2012) (describing how Justice
Scalia’s opinion “construct[s] a ‘new’ test that is purely property-rights driven” and is “the starting
point for the emergence, or perhaps re-emergence, of a ‘trespass-first’ test”).
101. Jones, 132 Sup. Ct. at 949.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 948–49, 952–53. The Court’s embrace of the property-based analysis is significant
because Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test had served as the basis of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment search analysis for nearly 40 years. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note
25, § 3.1.1, at 47.
104. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 954–55 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
106. See id. at 952–55.
107. Id. at 955.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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cannot reasonably be expected to be private, does not acknowledge the new
challenges of the digital information age where individuals reveal information
about themselves regularly in the course of an ordinary routine. 110 Accordingly,
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion suggests the need to re-analyze the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 111
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion also expressed concern that current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not meet the needs of the populous in light of
emerging technologies. 112 While Justice Alito opined that the Katz test should
be the sole Fourth Amendment test, he also made a distinction between short
and long-term monitoring of persons, concluding that only short-term
monitoring is reasonable. 113 Justice Alito ultimately called for legislative action

110. Id. at 957. Justice Sotomayor notes the following examples: “[p]eople disclose the phone
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers, the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries
and medications they purchase to online retailers.” Id.
111. Scholars have pointed to the language in Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s
concurring opinions to suggest that a majority of Supreme Court Justices would support a mosaic
theory of the Fourth Amendment. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012). Under the mosaic theory, a single act of permissible
surveillance may not amount to a Fourth Amendment search, but an on-going sequence of
permissible observations may together become an impermissible search, as “[p]rolonged
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance.” See United
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff’d
in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), mandamus denied sub nom. In re
Jones 670 F.3d 256 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Kerr, supra, at 313 (explaining that the mosaic theory
allows the Court to consider the constitutionality of searches “as a collective sequence of steps
rather than as individual steps”). Notably, the mosaic theory supplied the basis of the District of
Columbia Circuit’s opinion in Jones. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Kerr, supra (noting
that the D.C. Circuit court adopted the mosaic theory in Jones). The mosaic theory originated in
national security jurisprudence, as courts wrestled with the correct application of the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) in light of concerns that ordinarily insignificant information may
become more important when aggregated with other information. Bethany L. Dickman, Note,
Untying Knotts: The Application of Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v.
Maynard, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2011). The courts’ concerns were based on fears that a
potential adversary of the United States “could use FOIA to gather individual items of information
and piece them together to discover and exploit vulnerabilities.” Id. at 736–37.
112. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito criticizes the
property-rights test, explaining that the fact that an originalist approach considering what law
enforcement officials may have done at the time the Constitution was ratified is an “unwise” and
“highly artificial” means of determining what constituted a search. Id. at 957–58. Justice Alito
also asserted that the property-rights test is unsupported by current law and the language of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. Justice Alito also expressed concerns about maintaining Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test because as technology changes, so will people’s expectations. See id. at
962.
113. Id. at 964. Justice Alito applied the Katz test to the Jones facts and found that, under the
objective prong, society has recognized that monitoring an individual’s movements on public
streets for a short period of time is reasonable, but that long-term use of GPS devices for the same
purpose encroaches on privacy expectations. Id.
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in light of the judiciary’s limited powers to address privacy concerns raised by
emerging technologies that can impact Fourth Amendment protections. 114
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones thus suggests that both the traditional
property-rights approach and the Katz test are valid analyses to determine when
a Fourth Amendment search occurs. Therefore, cases involving UAVs should
be analyzed using both tests. 115
B. A New Challenge for the Fourth Amendment: The Domestic Use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is Set to Expand
While the history of drones is as long as the history of aviation, 116 the Federal
Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) safety regulations have served as a
significant impediment to widespread civilian use of UAVs in the United
States. 117 The FAA Modernization and Reform Act requires the FAA to
114. Id. at 964; see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (stating that
“statutory rules rather than constitutional rules should provide the primary source of privacy
protections regulating law-enforcement use of rapidly developing technologies”).
115. The Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines reaffirmed that the traditional
property rights analysis of the Fourth Amendment is, together with the Katz test, a valid “search”
test. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013). In Jardines, the Court held that a
police officer’s approach to the front door of a home with a drug-sniffing dog in order to obtain
information about the presence of marijuana in the home constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
Id. at 1413, 1417–18. The Court reasoned that by approaching the home’s front door, the officer
impermissibly trespassed upon the home’s curtilage, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1414.
116. See Charles Jarnot, History, in INTRODUCTION TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1, 1
(Richard Barnhart et al. eds., 2012); Dunlap, supra note 77, at 176–79 (tracing UAVs back to an
aircraft developed for the Navy in 1915). In fact, Charles Jarnot traced the history of unnamed
aerial vehicles to the kites, hot air balloons and other early aircraft that pre-date the dawn of modern
aviation. Jarnot, supra, at 1–2. First developed as an Aerial Torpedo for the U.S. Navy in 1918,
the military has extensively used UAVs for reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering roles over
the last century. Id. at 3, 5, 7–14; Dunlap, supra note 77, at 176–79. Today, there are approximately
7,494 UAVs serving the U.S. military, which accounts for approximately forty-one percent of the
U.S. military’s total aircraft inventory. GERTLER, supra note 7, at 9, fig. I. The military’s use of
drones has increased exponentially in the last decade; by comparison, in 2005 UAVs comprised
only five percent of military aircraft. Id. at 9. The U.S. military first widely deployed contemporary
UAV systems during Operation Desert Storm, which illustrated their potential, thereby resulted in
fast-tracking investments in modern UAV systems. Id. at 2; see also Jarnot, supra at 14–15.
Improved drone systems also debuted during U.S. operations in the Balkans in the 1990s.
GERTLER, supra note 7, at 2.
However, UAVs did not gain the
pre-eminent military roles that they have today until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
post-9/11. See Jarnot, supra at 15.
117. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 686–88 (noting that the burdensome FAA authorization
process has challenged law enforcement’s ability to operate drones). Aiming to maintain UAV
operations apart from “airspace frequently traversed by jet airliners and helicopters,” the FAA
typically only permits UAVs to operate “over relatively unpopulated areas.” Dunlap, supra note
77, at 182–83. FAA regulations also require all UAV operators to obtain a Certificate of
Authorization (COA) prior to use, a process overseen by small office within the FAA that has been
overwhelmed by applications. Vacek, supra note 51, at 686–87. Once the operator obtains a COA,
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establish regulations for the testing and licensing of commercial drones by 2015
and charges the FAA with expediting the Certificate of Authorization process
within the ninety day period after the law was passed. 118 Many fear these
provisions will lead to an expansion of the use of UAVs by law enforcement and
may result in more Brossart-like events around the country. 119 In fact, the FAA
estimates that as many as 15,000 UAVs may be in the nation’s skies by 2020.120
Some predict that UAV use could soon grow into an eighty-nine billion dollar
industry worldwide. 121
it is “only valid for a limited time and [imposes] strict requirements, such as daylight only flights,
required ‘chase’ aircraft and numerous safety precautions.” Dunlap, supra note 77, at 183. A chase
aircraft is “a manned aircraft that is used to follow a UA[V] and serves as the see-and-avoid function
for total flight safety. The pilot of the chase aircraft monitors for conflicting aircraft and is in
constant radio contact with the pilot in command of the UA[V] who is on the ground.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: MEASURING
PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION
INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 15 n.22 (2012).
118. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, §§ 332, 334, 126
Stat. 73, 76–77. The deadline for publishing the expedited COA regulations was November 10,
2012. Tim Starks, Fear of Prying, CQ WEEKLY, Oct. 22, 2012, at 2090, 2097. The Act also requires
that the FAA to:
[n]ot later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act . . . issue guidance
regarding the operation of public unmanned aircraft systems to (1) expedite the issuance
of a certificate of authorization process;(2) provide for a collaborative process with
public agencies to allow for an incremental expansion of access to the national airspace
system as technology matures and the necessary safety analysis and data become
available, and until standards are completed and technology issues are resolved . . .
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, § 334(a)(1)-(2); see also §§ 331–335 (providing
more rules and guidance on how the act must be implemented). In contrast to the United States,
Japan, South Korea, and Israel have already fully integrated UAVs into their national airspace
systems. CHAD HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21698, HOMELAND
SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE 7 (2010). Id.
119. Shaun Waterman, Coming to a Sky Near You; Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A1.
120. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS
2010-2030, at 48 (2010).
121. See Starks, supra note 118 at 2091. UAV use has expanded to the civilian sector and is
used for a number of purposes from weather forecasting, to homeland security and traffic
enforcement. See Dunlap, supra note 77, at 179 (stating that civilian missions for UAVs include
“emissions monitoring, weather forecasting, topographical mapping, wildlife management,
wildfire prevention and response, water management, homeland security, various commercial
applications and traffic management”). A number of companies and states are actively seeking to
profit from the expansion of civilian UAV use. See Barry Neild, Not just for Military Use, Drones
Turn Civilian, CNN (June 12, 2013 6:57 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/world
/europe/civilian-drones-farnborough/index.html. For example, the head of Maryland’s Office of
Military and Federal Affairs sees the state as uniquely positioned to benefit from the impending
UAV boom. See Matthew Hay Brown, Maryland Sees a Future in Drones, BALT. SUN (Aug. 13,
2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-13/news/bs-md-drones-20120813_1_unmanned
-aircraft-drones-unmanned-aerial-vehicle. He highlighted that Maryland already has at least
two-dozen businesses working on UAVs and that the state boasts a unique combination of
universities, federal facilities, and private sector interest in the industry. Id. Similarly, the
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The widespread use of UAVs in the United States has the potential to change
many aspects of daily life. 122 UAVs can be used both for commercial purposes
such as photography and agricultural purposes, 123 as well as for governmental
purposes such as surveillance. 124 Most public concern about the expanded use
of UAVs relates to their use by law enforcement as they give agencies the ability
to consistently monitor and investigate suspects from the sky, which potentially

government of Oklahoma has developed a strategic plan to encourage the development of UAV
businesses in the state. See GOVERNOR’S UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS COUNCIL, REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR’S UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS COUNCIL: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 5
(2012). The plan emphasized that Oklahoma has a number of advantages over other states in the
development of UAV business, including its robust infrastructure to support UAV test flights,
mature aviation market, and favorable geographical location. Id. at 5, 11–14. The UAV design
and development industry has grown organically along the Columbia River Gorge Region on the
Washington-Oregon border, where a number of amateur aeronautical engineers and start-up
enterprises are developing drone technology that has been adopted by the military and exhibited
around the world. See Richard Connif, Drones are Ready for Takeoff, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June
2011), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Drones-are-Ready-for
-Takeoff.html?c=y&page=1. On December 30, 2013, the FAA announced the selection of six
congressionally-mandated UAV test sites that will conduct necessary research for the integration
of UAVs into the national airspace system. Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, FAA
Selects Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research and Test Sites (Dec. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news
_story.cfm?newsid=15576. The six test sites are located in Alaska, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
122. See Connif, supra note 121 (suggesting that “the adjustment to drones will be as
challenging as the adjustment to horseless carriages at the start of the 20th Century” and chronicling
how drones are increasingly used for civilian purposes and for performing new missions that
formerly required a human-guided aircraft).
123. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 77, at 179 n.43 (noting that most UAVs are used
commercially in “Japan for agricultural purposes” and that they can do the work of approximately
fifteen men). UAVs are also being marketed as an inexpensive alternative to private security. See
Neild, supra note 121.
124. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) (2011),
available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_fact_sheet.pdf [hereinafter FAA,
FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS]. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
operates the largest law enforcement drone fleet in the United States. See Rob Margetta & Tim
Starks, Eyes on the Border, at a High Cost, CQ WEEKLY, Oct. 22, 2012, at 2094, 2094. However,
a number of CBP’s drones are not being used to their maximum potential due to their high operating
costs. Id. at 2094–95. Other federal agencies operating drones within the United States include:
the Department of Defense, which utilizes them for “training for overseas operations”; NASA,
which employs them for “wildfire mapping and collect[ing] hurricane data”; the Department of the
Interior, which uses them for “Geological Survey studies”; the Department of Energy, which
conducts “drone research at national laboratories”; The Department of Justice, for FBI law
-enforcement support; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which
conducts “drone research”; and the Department of State, which is testing drones for its “embassy
surveillance program.” Starks, supra note 118, at 2092. State and local government agencies,
including the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, the Miami-Dade, Florida Police
Department and the Montgomery County, Texas Sheriff’s Office are also using drone for a variety
of missions. Id. at 2092–93.
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diminishes Fourth Amendment protections. 125 This concern is heightened
because UAVs are able to conduct surveillance undetected due to their design
and their capability to fly at high altitudes. 126 As the cost of using UAVs
decreases, and their ease of use and availability increases, 127 many fear that
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not afford enough protection
from government surveillance by drones. 128
C. State v. Brossart: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Become Part of American Life
Against the background of an expected expansion of domestic UAV use State
v. Brossart has attracted widespread media attention because it is among the
earliest and most dramatic cases involving UAV use by law enforcement

125. See Vacek, supra note 51, at 677 (discussing how new legislation should be enacted to
deal with the new issues raised by the use of drones); Associated Press, Talk of Drones Patrolling
U.S. Skies Spawns Anxiety, USA TODAY (June 19, 2012 9:13 AM), http://www.usa
today.com/news/washington/story/2012-06-19/drone-backlash/55682654/1 (noting how many
groups have raised concerns about the privacy issues related to drone use); Koebler, supra note 17
(discussing a Brookings Institute Panel that focused on UAV use and warned that, while UAVs can
benefit law enforcement and businesses, the implications of widespread use should be thoroughly
considered by the government); Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watchingyou (highlighting the extensive surveillance capabilities of UAVs and their ability to go undetected,
raising Fourth Amendment concerns). In fact, the FBI has acknowledged that it has already
deployed drones in limited domestic law enforcement operations. See Craig Whitlock, FAA Says
it Authorized 4 FBI Drone Missions, WASH. POST, June 21, 2013, at A7 (detailing FBI use of drones
on United States soil during four FBI missions); Jake Miller, FBI Director Acknowledges Domestic
Drone Use, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162
-57590065/fbi-director-acknowledges-domestic-drone-use/.
Other concerns regarding the
increased civilian UAV use include the fear that they may threaten air safety, cause mid-air
collisions, or be used as a terrorist weapon. Starks, supra note 118, at 2096.
126. Lynch, supra note 125. Modern UAVs “come in a variety of shapes and sizes” and can
have a “wingspan as large as a Boeing 737 or be smaller than a radio-controlled model aircraft.”
FAA, FACTSHEET: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, supra note 124. The U.S. military’s largest
drone, the Global Hawk, has a length of 48 feet, a wingspan of 131 feet, weighs 32,250 pounds and
can reach an altitude of 60,000 feet. GERTLER, supra note 7, at 31 tbl.6, 32 fig.5. In contrast, CQ
Weekly highlights that AeroVironment, Inc. has developed the Nano Hummingbird, a drone that
weighs less than an ounce. Starks, supra note 118, at 2091. In fact, there has been speculation in
the press that the United States has developed and utilized insect-sized UAVs that allow for nearly
undetectable close-range surveillance. Tom Leonard, US Accused of Using Robotic Insect Spies,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (Oct. 11, 2007), at 19.
127. See Abramson, supra note 17 (examining how homemade UAVs are being built and
operated by hobbyists using readily available parts at a lower cost and how police departments in
rural areas can use them because they are small and easily transported).
128. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090, 2092, 2095 (reporting that many members of
Congress are concerned by both the loss of privacy drones may cause and the Court’s failure to
adequately curtail aerial surveillance, leading to Republican and Democratic members of Congress
introducing legislation to strengthen the public’s privacy protections again the government’s use of
drones on civilians).
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officials in United States. 129 The conflict arose in June 2011 when three
cow-calf pairs belonging to Chris Anderson entered an abandoned missile site
rented by Rodney Brossart. 130 After locating the cattle on Brossart’s rented
property, Anderson approached Brossart and offered to remove the cattle from
Brossart’s land. 131 However, Brossart told Anderson that he could not remove
the cattle until he paid for the damages they had done to his property. 132
Anderson then contacted the Nelson County, North Dakota Sheriff’s Office for
assistance in recovering the cattle. 133
Upon learning of the disagreement between Anderson and Brossart, the
sheriff’s office dispatched officers to speak with Brossart regarding the disputed
cattle. 134 During that conversation, the officers advised Brossart that they had
proof of Anderson’s ownership of the cattle and offered to confirm ownership
by looking at the cattle. 135 In response, Brossart warned the officers that they
would not return if they attempted to enter his property. 136 Taking this warning
129. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2093 (discussing the use of a drone in a situation involving
a North Dakota rancher); Koebler, supra note 6 (explaining the holding in Brossart validated the
use of UAVs under the circumstances); Koebler, supra note 10 (laying out the facts in Brossart and
stating that Brossart was “the first American citizen to be arrested with the help of a Predator
surveillance drone”); see also Domestic Drone Justice: US Court Green-Lights Police UAV Use,
supra note 10 (reporting the Brossart decision on a Russian-sponsored news website).
130. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss at 2, State v. Brossart, No.
32-2011-CR-00049 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012).
131. Id. at 2–3.
132. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049
(Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012). Brossart alleged that Anderson’s cow-calf pairs consumed “feed
and hay intended for the Brossarts’ own cattle,” and that he was acting consistent with North Dakota
law by requiring payment for their return. Id. (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 36-11-10(1) (2011))
(according to North Dakota law, “the person suffering damages by reason of the trespass of any
livestock may take up the offending livestock” and “may retain the livestock . . . until
. . . [t]he damages sustained by reason of the trespass and the costs in the action to recover the
damages have been paid.”).
133. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 2–3; State’s Response to
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3.
134. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3; State’s Response to
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3. The Brossart events took place
in Lakota, North Dakota, a small town with a population of 672. Koebler, supra note 10; see
Community Facts for Lakota City, North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder
2.census.gov/ (enter “Lakota City, North Dakota” in state, county, town, or zip code search box
and click on “Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010” under the “2010
Demographic Profile SF” Dataset). Brossart had a history of litigating against the Nelson County
Sherriff’s Office. See State v. Brossart, 729 N.W.2d 137 (N.D. 2007) (affirming Brossart’s
conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest based on a confrontation with police
following a citation for unauthorized maintenance of a road); State’s Response to Defendants’
Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 7–8. The officers, accompanied by a field agent
of the North Dakota Stockmen’s Association, located Brossart while he was working near his farm.
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 3; State’s Response to Defendants’
Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3.
135. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3.
136. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip Op., at 3–4 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012).
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as a threat, the officers asked Brossart to cooperate or face arrest. 137 Brossart
ignored their request and returned to his tractor, prompting the officers to detain
him. 138 The officers then approached Thomas Brossart, Brossart’s adult son
who had arrived on the scene, and requested to enter the Brossart property to
“check on the cattle.” 139 Thomas advised the officers that they would not be
allowed on the property to see the cattle until they had a valid search warrant. 140
The officers then left the scene to obtain a warrant. 141
The officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to enter the rented land
that afternoon and served the warrant at the Brossart home, which was located a
half-mile from the rented land. 142 However, as they entered onto Brossart’s
property to serve the search warrant, the three Brossart sons, Alex, Thomas and
Jacob, rushed at the officers with guns drawn. 143 This action resulted in a
standoff between the officers and the three sons. 144 During the standoff, the
police deployed an MQ-9 Predator B Drone obtained through an agreement with

137. Id. at 4.
138. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3; State’s Response to
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 3. The police argue that Brossart
was arrested for committing the following misdemeanors under the North Dakota Livestock Estray
Law: “resisting arrest, criminal mischief, theft of property and terrorizing.” Id. at 4, 12. Brossart
actively resisted his arrest and ordered the officers to “show him the writ.” Id. at 3. As a result,
the officers tased Brossart several times before placing Brossart in the patrol car. Brief in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3–4. Following the incident, “Brossart appeared to be
passed out and unresponsive” and an ambulance was called. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR
-00049, at 4. Jacob and Abby Brossart, two of Brossart’s adult children, were also detained during
this initial encounter. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 3–4; State’s
Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 9–10. The police claim
that Jacob Brossart was detained for approaching the Brossart pickup after his father yelled at him
to get two rifles located in the front seat of the pickup. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 9. He was not arrested at that time and he was released after
his father was placed in the police car. Id. Abby was arrested after she struck the right arm of one
of the officers. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at
9–10.
139. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4.
140. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10.
141. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4; State’s Response to
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10.
142. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4; State’s Response to
Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10. Prior to serving the warrant at
the Brossart home, officers returned to the Brossart’s rented property, where they were confronted
by Thomas and Alex Brossart. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, at 5. The police then approached
the Brossart home to serve the search warrant directly to an adult from whose property the evidence
was being taken. See State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note
130, at 10–11. North Dakota law allows an officer who is taking property under a warrant to serve
the warrant directly to the person who owns the property from which the property is taken or leave
to it at the location from where the property was taken. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2).
143. State’s Response to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 10.
144. Id.
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the United States Department of Homeland Security. 145 The UAV was deployed
without obtaining an additional warrant, purportedly “to help assure that there
weren’t any weapons [on the Brossart property] and to make the arrest safer for
both the Brossarts and law enforcement.” 146 The next morning, officers entered
the Brossart property to recover the cattle and arrested three of the Brossart
children after they again confronted officers. 147 The Brossarts did not learn that
a UAV had been deployed during the standoff until after their arrest. 148
The Brossarts filed motions to dismiss the criminal charges against them or,
in the alternative, to suppress evidence against them. 149 They contended that the
court should suppress the evidence gathered through the use of the UAV because
UAV technology is not available to the general public, 150 and because it was
obtained in an unreasonable manner. 151 The trial court denied the motions,
finding that “there was no improper use of an unmanned aerial vehicle,” as “[i]t
appears to have had no bearing on” the charges brought against the Brossarts. 152

145. See Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, at 6; Koebler, supra note 6. U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security, currently operates
the largest law enforcement drone fleet in the United States. Margetta & Starks, supra note 124, at
2094–95. The fleet is made up of 10 MQ-9 Predator B’s that are used to monitor the U.S. border.
Id. CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones have a length of 36 feet, a wingspan of 66 feet, and can operate
for up to 20 hours at an altitude of up to 50,000 feet and with a speed of up to 240 knots (276 miles
per hour). Id. CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones operate from four bases around the United States,
including one in Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. Id. This type of cooperation
between CBP and local law enforcement is not unprecedented; drones from various DHS
components have been used domestically to “support federal and state agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD) Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service and the Texas Rangers.” RICHARD M. THOMPSON II,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 3 (2012).
146. KOEBLER, supra note 10; see Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at
5, 19 (discussing the warrantless use of the UAV that gathered the intelligence); State’s Response
to Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss, supra note 130, at 12 (acknowledging the use of the
drone, but arguing that it was not used for investigative purposes).
147. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 5. The Brossart children were
arrested for “commit[ing] the offense of terrorizing.” State’s Resp. to Defs.’ Combined Mot. to
Dismiss, supra note 130, at 13.
148. Koebler, supra note 10.
149. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 1. The Brossarts presented the
following arguments: (1) the charges presented against Rodney Brossart were improvident; (2)
Rodney Brossart was improperly arrested without a warrant as a crime had not occurred;
(3) the police used excessive force in Rodney Brossart’s arrest; (4) unlawful de facto arrest of Jacob
Brossart; (5) unlawful arrest of Abbey Brossart; (6) warrantless entry into the Brossart property;
(7) the use of the UAV was unlawful; and (8) general use of outrageous police conduct, requiring
suppression of the evidence. Id. at 8, 12, 15, 17–20.
150. Id. at 19 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001)).
151. Id. at 20.
152. State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31, 2012).
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II. THE BROSSART FACTS DO NOT AMOUNT TO A FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH
Based on the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
determination of whether the Brossart facts constitute a Fourth Amendment
search must be made using both the historical property right analysis of the
Fourth Amendment and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. 153
Applying these tests, the Brossart court correctly found that use of a UAV did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 154 However, the Brossart decision
underscores that the Fourth Amendment should provide greater protections
against searches by UAVs and similar technologies.
A. Applying the Property Rights Test in Brossart
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones breathed new life into the traditional
property rights analysis of the Fourth Amendment, which now must be used in
conjunction with Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test to analyze
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred. 155 Under this test, the
government’s physical trespass on private property in an effort to discover
information is an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search. 156 Existing case law
suggests that the government’s use of a UAV in circumstances like those
in Brossart does not constitute a trespass. 157
Current jurisprudence on low-altitude airspace property rights is not
well-defined. 158 In United States v. Causby, the Supreme Court held that
“[f]lights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use
of the land.” 159 This language is echoed in Ciraolo and Riley, which suggest
that investigations conducted from an airplane or a helicopter flying from legally
navigable airspace do not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, unless the
investigation affects the defendant’s use of his property. 160 Applying these
precedents, the Brossart court found that the government’s use of a UAV did
153. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
154. See KOEBLER, supra note 10.
155. See supra, Part I.A.6.
156. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670
F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 25, at 51–55
(discussing the property rights analysis, which looked at Fourth Amendment questions in light of
whether a constitutionally protected area was breached).
157. See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
158. See Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land,
56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 198 (1990) (“With no definitive standard yet enunciated, and courts mixed
in their approach to the question, landowners must still wonder just exactly what their property
rights are to the airspace above their land.”).
159. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946). The Causby decision recognized
that “airspace is a public highway,” but emphasized that a landowner “must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.” Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
160. See supra note 86 Part I.A.5.
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not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because there was no evidence that
the flyover occurred outside navigable airspace or interfered with the Brossart’s
use of the land. 161
Given the facts, the Brossarts could not argue that a trespass occurred. In their
brief, the Brossarts alleged that the UAV “was not visible or detectable by
ordinary observation.” 162 This allegation suggests that the MQ-9 Predator B
drone used during the standoff must have been at a sufficient altitude to fly
undetected. 163 Brossart also admitted that he did not learn of the drone’s use
until months after his arrest, indicating that the drone did not interfere with his
use of the land. 164 Thus, the Brossart court could not find that the Government
physically trespassed into Brossart’s land.
B. Applying the Katz Test in Brossart
To successfully prove that the Nelson County Sherriff Office’s deployment of
a UAV over their property during the standoff constituted a Fourth Amendment
search, the Brossarts needed to meet both the subjective and objective prongs of
the Katz test in order. 165 As the Brossarts’ property was marked with a “No
Trespassing” sign, and they repeatedly asked the sheriff to produce a search
warrant, it seems clear that they possessed a subjective expectation of privacy
and thus easily met Katz’s subjective prong. 166 However, applying the
principles established through subsequent Katz-based jurisprudence, the
Brossarts had difficulty meeting the objective prong of the test. 167
1. The Brossart Court Could Not Find That the Technology Used to Survey
the Brossart’s Property was Unreasonable
The Brossarts’ strongest argument that the use of the UAV did not comport
with society’s expectations of privacy is Kyllo’s assertion that a government
search investigating the details of a home and utilizing “a device that is not in
general public use” is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 168 Under this argument, the defendants could have challenged

161. See infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
162. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19.
163. The MQ-9 Predator B is a relatively large drone that can travel at up to 276 miles per hour
at an altitude of 50,000 feet. See supra note 141. In fact, the MQ-9 Predator B is thirteen feet
longer, has a wingspan sixteen feet longer and a more powerful engine than earlier Predator models.
GERTLER, supra note 7, at 35. Flying at altitude above 500 feet is generally considered to be within
navigable airspace in rural areas. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
164. KOEBLER, supra note 10.
165. See supra, Part I A.6.
166. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189 n.9 (1984) (acknowledging that by placing
“No Trespassing” signs and fences, the defendants may have had an expectation of privacy).
167. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
168. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 40 (2001).
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both the use of the UAV to survey their property, as well as the use of the
technology that the UAV carries.
a. Past Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Permits Aerial Surveillance
Even applying the Kyllo standard, the court correctly found that the mere use
of the UAV does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. In its aerial
surveillance jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the
government is free to inspect what is visible from “the vantage point of an
aircraft flying in the navigable airspace.” 169 Observation conducted from a UAV
is analogous to observation conducted from airplanes and helicopters. 170 This
analogy suggests that, as the use of aerial surveillance has become
commonplace, the court’s decision in Brossart is in line with the Supreme
Court’s aerial surveillance decisions. 171
b. The Brossart Defendants Did Not Challenge the Use of the Technology
Carried by the Drone
The Brossarts’ best argument would have been a challenge to the use of the
technology carried by the UAV. CBP’s MQ-9 Predator B drones are equipped
with electro-optical and infrared sensors and a surface search radar that can
locate moving targets on the ground. 172 Unlike aircrafts, these tools are
sense-enhancing technologies not in general public use and can be compared to
the infrared thermal image scanner used by government agents in Kyllo. 173
However, while the Brossarts argued that Kyllo’s holding on sense-enhancing
technology should apply in their case, they failed to challenge the use of these

169. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213–14 (1986) (concluding that the defendant’s expectation of privacy from information that it
willingly exposed to aerial surveillance “is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is
prepared to honor”).
170. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM MQ-9 PREDATOR B (2011), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler
/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/marine/uas.ctt/uas.pdf. In fact, the MQ-9 Predator B may be more
analogous to airplanes and helicopters than other UAVs as it is remotely piloted from the ground.
Id. In contrast, future drone systems could be fully automated and controlled entirely by on-board
computers and sensors. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2096 (reporting that Congress allowed the
FAA to authorize that drones be outfitted with technologies that avoid collisions and allow them to
become pilotless); Connif, supra note 121 (describing how current unmanned aircraft “typically
require at least two people . . . doing ground control” and that developers are envisioning future
drones that could “take off . . . land [and] refuel without human assistance”).
171. See supra Part I.A.5.
172. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, supra note 170.
173. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30, 34 (discussing the mechanics of the thermal imagers and
describing the technology as not commonly used by the public).
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technologies, instead concentrating exclusively on the UAV itself. 174 As this
argument was not articulated, the Brossart court could not consider it. 175
2. The Brossarts Did Not Allege that the UAV Observed the Interior of the
Brossart Home
The Brossart argument that the government violated the Fourth Amendment
by using technological capabilities unavailable to the general public was
insufficient for the court to find that a Fourth Amendment search occurred. 176
In Oliver, the Court held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in activities conducted in open fields, except for those intimate activities
conducted within the curtilage of the home. 177 Oliver also demonstrates that
“open fields” is an expansive term that includes closed-off areas close to a
defendant’s home, even if the areas cannot be seen from publicly-accessible
land. 178 To successfully challenge the use of a UAV as an impermissible search,
the Brossarts needed to demonstrate that the UAV and its instruments revealed
information about the interior of their home. 179 The Brossart facts do not
provide sufficient information about the specific areas the UAV observed and
the Brossarts did not argue that the UAV revealed any information about the
interior of their home. 180 As a result, the Brossart court could not consider this
argument. 181
3. The Length of the UAV Observations May Not Have Been Unreasonable
Applying the Katz test in his Jones dissent, Justice Alito wrote that, under
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “relatively short-term monitoring of
a person’s movements” is considered reasonable, but “longer term” monitoring
“impinges on expectations of privacy” in many situations. 182 While Justice
Alito’s decision does not clearly identify the line between short and long-term
surveillance, this language suggests that the Brossarts could have challenged the

174. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19.
175. See State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31,
2012).
176. See id. (finding that the use of a UAV was not unreasonable in this case); Brief in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19 (noting that the Kyllo decision suggests that the use of
sense-enhancing technology is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
177. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
178. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
179. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding a Fourth Amendnet violation
where technology not in public use was used to gather information about the interior of the home).
180. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20.
181. See Brossart, No. 23-2011-CR-00049 at 12 (dismissing the UAV argument without
discussion).
182. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring), mandamus
denied sub nom. In re Joes, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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length of the UAV observations. 183 However, the Brossart facts suggest that the
UAV’s observations were conducted over a short period of time on the morning
when the arrests took place, 184 which is far shorter than the four-week period of
observation implicated in Jones. 185 Furthermore, the Brossarts failed to present
the argument that the length of the observations was unreasonable. 186 As a
result, the Brossart court was unable to find that the period of observation was
unreasonably long. 187
C. The Brossart Court Correctly Found that the Use of an Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Did Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search
The Nelson County District Court correctly found that the use of a UAV did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Based on current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the court could have only concluded that a Fourth
Amendment search had occurred if the defendants alleged that the UAV carried
sense-enhancing technology that was used to monitor the interior of the Brossart
home. 188 The Brossart’s Brief in Support of a Motion to Dismiss only challenges
the government’s use of a UAV on the basis that UAVs are not currently
available for general public use. 189 As UAVs are strongly analogous to other
aircrafts and the aerial surveillance likely took place from navigable airspace,
the Brossart court correctly denied the Brossarts’ motion to dismiss. 190
III. BROSSART HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE IMPENDING WIDESPREAD DOMESTIC UAV USE
A close analysis of the Brossart facts reveals that the case was properly
decided under existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, Brossart
also highlights how the imminent expansion of the use of UAVs on civilians in
the United States presents a challenge to current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 191 The use of UAVs will require that both the courts and

183. See id. (noting that there is not a specific time where monitoring becomes unreasonable,
though four weeks was in Jones, and acknowledging that another case could “present more difficult
questions”).
184. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 4–5.
185. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
186. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20.
187. See State v. Brossart, No. 32-2011-CR-00049, Slip op. at 12 (Dist. Ct. N.D. July 31,
2012).
188. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
180 (1984).
189. See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 132, at 19–20.
190. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.
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Congress properly balance the government’s desire to use a powerful
law-enforcement tool with privacy protections for individuals. 192
This challenge was foreshadowed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion
in United States v. Jones. 193 Like the GPS technology used in Jones, UAVs
allow the Government to inexpensively monitor a person’s every movement, and
to “ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits and so on.” 194 Such extensive surveillance certainly has the capacity to
chill “associational and expressive freedoms.” 195 Yet, so long as such
monitoring occurs in open fields, or, in most cases, in the curtilage of the home,
current Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence will not protect individuals in
circumstances similar to Mr. Brossart. 196
In Jones, Justice Alito suggests that legislation is the most effective way to
balance privacy and public safety concerns related to the government’s use of
devices that allow for long-term monitoring of individuals. 197 Now that
Congress has authorized an increased use of UAVs for civilian purposes, it
should also enact measures that give the government the ability to use this
powerful law-enforcement tool, while safeguarding the public’s privacy. 198
Current legislative initiatives suggest that there is a bipartisan push for
legislation to balance the government’s use of UAVs with the public’s privacy
concerns. 199 Three bills aiming to protect the public’s privacy from increased
use of UAVs for civilian government purposes were introduced in the 112th
Congress. 200 However, these bills have been criticized as overly broad in
protecting privacy and severely limiting the government’s ability to use
192. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090 (noting the potential privacy concerns of widespread
UAV use and the need for legislative action).
193. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
194. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), mandamus denied
sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Scholars have pointed to this language as
supporting the adoption of the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 108.
195. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956.
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
198. Congressional action to regulate the use of emerging practices and technologies for
privacy purposes has firm precedents. See id. at 962–63 (discussing legislation passed to deal with
Fourth Amendment questions related to wiretapping).
199. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2090, 2092–93 (discussing bipartisan legislative action to
address the privacy concerns related to UAVs); see also Associated Press, supra note 125 (noting
that concerns over the civil-liberty issues raised by the use of UAVs has led to bipartisan
discussions of UAV legislation).
200. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18–19. The bills include the Preserving Freedom from
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012 (H.R. 5925, S. 3287), the Preserving American Privacy Act
of 2012 (H.R. 6199), and the Farmers’ Privacy Act of 2012 (H.R. 5961). Id. Concerns over the
potential dangers the government’s domestic use of UAVs have also been raised in the new 113th
Congress, leading to a thirteen-hour filibuster seeking to block the Senate’s approval of the
President’s nominee to lead the CIA. See Ed O’Keefe and Aaron Blake, Senator Holds Long
Fillibuster to Oppose Obama’s Drone Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2013, at A2.
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UAVs. 201 For example, the Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 would
only permit UAV use by law enforcement “except pursuant to [a] warrant and
in the investigation of a felony” and excludes all evidence obtained in violation
of the Act from criminal proceedings. 202 This approach may prevent law
enforcement from operating UAVs in open fields for securing large-crowd
events or enforcing traffic laws, both of which are permitted under current
jurisprudence. The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of
2012 takes a more nuanced approach, prohibiting the warrantless use of a UAV
to collect evidence regarding criminal conduct or a violation of a regulation, but
specifically allowing UAVs to be used to patrol the border, to prevent imminent
danger to life, and to manage situation with high risks of terrorist attacks. 203 Yet,
this proposed Act is overly restrictive because it prevents law enforcement from
using UAVs in open fields. 204
Instead, Congress should find a way to allow law enforcement to use this
valuable tool in all necessary circumstances, while also taking into consideration
Fourth Amendment rights. 205 To accomplish this, Congress should aim to
clarify how current principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence apply to
UAVs and add additional privacy protections that account for their unique
capabilities. 206 Following current Fourth Amendment principles, stronger
privacy protections should be applied to criminal and regulatory investigations
and more liberal rules applied to non-invasive uses, such as locating lost persons
or assessing damages from natural disasters. 207 Similarly, Congress should
codify the Fourth Amendment’s strong protection of the home by requiring that
a warrant be issued before the government can use UAV-mounted technologies
201. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2095–96 (noting that some members of Congress, local
government officials, and UAV industry representatives have expressed concerns that an overregulation of privacy concerns may stifle the industry’s growth and prevent the government from
using UAVs for desirable purposes); Tim Adelman, Flurry of ‘Drone’ Bills’ Shows Congress Has
Much to Learn, THE HILL (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/foreign-policy/250597-flurry-of-drone-bills-shows-congress-has-much-to-learn (arguing that
Congress is right to consider privacy protection measures as UAV technology becomes widely
used, but that such measures should not excessively limit the government’s use of UAV’s).
202. H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2012).
203. S. 3287, 112th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2012); H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2012).
204. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18 (showing there is no open fields exception under
either form of the bill).
205. See Starks, supra note 118, at 2095 (noting the importance of legislation that does not
overly restrict UAV use).
206. See THOMPSON, supra note 145, at 18 (discussing legislation that has restricted
government surveillance tools further than the court, and suggesting Congress do the same with
UAVs).
207. Jones suggests that the latter category would not constitute a search, as “mere visual
observation does not constitute a search.” See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012),
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Jones, 670 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Tim Adelman argues that
the use of UAVs to find lost hikers, survey multi-car crashes, and other similar activities are
government uses of drones that do not intrude on privacy and should not be discouraged. Adelman,
supra note 201.
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to conduct surveillance revealing information about the interior of the home. 208
To address privacy concerns of long-term UAV surveillance, Congress should
permit surveillance of spaces falling within the open fields doctrine, but place a
time limit on aerial surveillance preventing the government from conducting
long-term investigations of individuals without prior judicial approval. 209
Lastly, Congressional action should also aim to limit unwanted invasions of
privacy by private citizens, which falls outside of the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 210
IV. CONCLUSION
As the use of UAVs domestically becomes significantly more widespread,
many have expressed concerns about capacity of current Fourth Amendment
search jurisprudence’s to effectively manage both privacy rights and law
enforcement’s use of this new and powerful tool. As one of the first cases in the
United States in which a UAV was used, State v. Brossart has become a symbol
of the anxiety brought on by domestic use of UAVs. Nonetheless, the Brossart
facts do not pose new questions of law. But, the case highlights some of the
weaknesses of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on searches,
particularly as to how courts handle new technologies. It also serves as a call to
both the courts and legislators to more clearly define the Fourth Amendment’s
protections in light of emerging technologies.

208. See supra Part I A.4 (highlighting the Court’s strong protection of the home).
209. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
210. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5 (4th ed.
2011) (explaining that the Constitution’s protection of civil liberties “appl[ies] only to the
government; private conduct generally does not have to comply with the Constitution”). Section 5
of The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 forbids federal agencies from permitting private
entities from monitoring an individual “without the consent of that other private person or the owner
of any real property on which that other private person is present.” H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. §5
(2012).
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